Loss & Damage - Briefing Materials
What is Loss and Damage?
A UNFCCC introduction to the topic states that “Loss and damage arising from the adverse effects of climate change can include those related to extreme weather events but also slow onset events, such as sea level rise, increasing temperatures, ocean acidification, glacial retreat and related impacts, salinization, land and forest degradation, loss of biodiversity and desertification.”
But as this explainer from LSE tells us “‘Loss and Damage’ has a distinct but contested meaning in the international climate change policy debate. It is predominately about how to support developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.”
It is this debate that now dominates discussions at COP27, how to support vulnerable countries, that have often contributed the least to climate change, in a way that is fair and achievable?
For the first time at a COP Loss and Damage has made it to the official finance agenda for the conference and will be a fascinating topic to watch in the coming days. In this blog, we give some thoughts on negotiations surrounding Loss & Damage, links to further reading, and the relevant text from Article 8 & 9 of the Paris Agreement to be used in discussions if you are attending COP27.
Thoughts on Negotiations
There is one group of countries with a fairly unanswerable case that they are grievously impacted by climate change without having been responsible for it through their emissions. As we note in our film for COP27 on “Climate Carnage in Pakistan” and its impact on education, Pakistan is responsible for less than 1% of global emissions yet a third of its country is under water. The Maldives is responsible for 0.07% of cumulative global emissions, yet may disappear altogether through the “slow onset event” of sea level rise.
Africa as a whole has contributed only 4% of cumulative global emissions, yet is suffering from catastrophic floods in Nigeria, and droughts in Kenya, Somalia, Madagascar. These countries are arguing that “we did not cause this, your emissions did, you should pay.”
There is another group of developed countries that are extremely reluctant to sign up to any form of words that may imply that they are ‘liable’ for ‘compensation’ or ‘reparations’ for existing or historic climate change, because, their negotiators will know, that could be a blank cheque for trillions of dollars which they either cannot pay or would be unable to broker with their societies and electorates.
There is also a group of countries who seem to be sitting out the debates while collecting vast oil and gas revenues from their national oil and gas companies, or forging ahead with the continued development of coal mining and coal fired power.
Faced with a negotiating impasse like that, I sometimes think of my cousin Harry. As a small boy, his mother gave him a bowl of stew for supper. Harry started in with his top line negotiating position: “I don’t like stew! I don’t want stew! I won’t eat the stew!”. It looked as though the talks were in trouble. But Harry’s mother calmly remarked “Well, just eat the meat and vegetables and leave the stew”. Harry and I were not as sharp as today’s young climate negotiators, and a short while later the bowl was empty.
Between the seemingly irreconcilable negotiating positions above, there may be a whole variety of constructive outcomes that would move this issue on. They might be structural, such as ensuring that loss and damage is a regular feature of the COP agendas, or the subject of a special report of the IPCC. They might be substantive, such as the establishment of a separate funding facility for loss and damage, and even more, the level of funding allocated to it. Or they might be interim measures that could be agreed while the high level arguments on loss and damage continue, perhaps taking elements from Article 8 of the Paris Agreement. Pakistan could benefit from “early warning systems” on some of its 7,200 glacial outlets, and surely any help to rebuild 25,000 schools and 700,000 houses should re-build the “resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems”. The Maldives needs help to address sea level rise. Somalia and Madagascar need help to address drought as a slow onset event.
It is no longer credible to be deflected from addressing continued fossil fuel use by the pressure of current events, and it is no longer credible to try to put off taking practical and positive steps to address loss and damage.
Further Reading on Loss & Damage
By way of general context and background, the Financial Times story from 10 October 2022 Loss and damage” set to dominate COP27 agenda
We found this background briefing from the think tank Chatham House on What is Loss and Damage to be clear and helpful.
Two further background papers from the LSE / Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment:
You can find the UNFCCC Introduction to Loss and Damage here, with links to detailed structures for channeling loss and damage discussions, such as the Warsaw International Mechanism and the Glasgow climate pact.
This Reuters story from 4 November 2022 Flood-hit Pakistan seeks loss and damage ‘compensation’ at COP27 is informative about the approach of the G77+China grouping.
Our interview in July 2022 with the Youth Climate Negotiator Shreya KC also covered her experience of the negotiations in Bonn in the summer of 2022 and the treatment of “loss and damage” at those talks.
Paris Agreement Text
If you are attending COP27 and are involved in discussions around Loss & Damage, it may be useful to have the original text from the Paris Agreement to hand, especially the text of Article 8 (Loss and Damage) and Article 9 (financial resources):
Article 8 and COP decision
The Paris outcome on loss and damage
Article 8 of the Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21 Paragraphs 48–52 (FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1.) The full text is available here.
Parties recognize the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage.
The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement and may be enhanced and strengthened, as determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.
Parties should enhance understanding, action and support, including through the Warsaw International Mechanism, as appropriate, on a cooperative and facilitative basis with respect to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change.
Accordingly, areas of cooperation and facilitation to enhance understanding, action and support may include:
(a) Early warning systems;
(b) Emergency preparedness;
(c) Slow onset events;
(d) Events that may involve irreversible and permanent loss and damage;
(e) Comprehensive risk assessment and management;
(f) Risk insurance facilities, climate risk pooling and other insurance solutions;
(g) Non-economic losses;
(h) Resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems.The Warsaw International Mechanism shall collaborate with existing bodies and expert groups under the Agreement, as well as relevant organizations and expert bodies outside the Agreement.
The full text is available here.
Article 9
1. Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention.
2. Other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily.
3. As part of a global effort, developed country Parties should continue to take the lead in mobilizing climate finance from a wide variety of sources, instruments and channels, noting the significant role of public funds, through a variety of actions, including supporting country-driven strategies, and taking into account the needs and priorities of developing country Parties. Such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression beyond previous efforts.
4. The provision of scaled-up financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation, taking into account country-driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries and small island developing States, considering the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation.
5. Developed country Parties shall biennially communicate indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties. Other Parties providing resources are encouraged to communicate biennially such information on a voluntary basis.
6. The global stocktake referred to in Article 14 shall take into account the relevant information provided by developed country Parties and/or Agreement bodies on efforts related to climate finance.
7. Developed country Parties shall provide transparent and consistent information on support for developing country Parties provided and mobilized through public interventions biennially in accordance with the modalities, procedures and guidelines to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement, at its first session, as stipulated in Article 13, paragraph 13. Other Parties are encouraged to do so.
8. The Financial Mechanism of the Convention, including its operating entities, shall serve as the financial mechanism of this Agreement.
9. The institutions serving this Agreement, including the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention, shall aim to ensure efficient access to financial resources through simplified approval procedures and enhanced readiness support for developing country Parties, in particular for the least developed countries and small island developing States, in the context of their national climate strategies and plans.